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The title of Beth Shapiro’s ‘How to Clone a Mammoth’ contains an implicature: it suggests that 
it is indeed possible to clone a mammoth, to bring extinct species back from the dead.  But in 
fact Shapiro both denies this is possible, and denies there would be good reason to do it even if 
it were possible. The de-extinct ‘mammoths’ she speaks of are merely ecological proxies for 
mammoths—elephants re-engineered for cold-tolerance by the addition to their genomes of a 
few mammoth genes. Shapiro’s denial that genuine species de-extinction is possible is based on 
her assumption that the resurrected organisms would need to be perfectly indistinguishable 
from the creatures that died out. In this article I use the example of an extinct New Zealand 
wattlebird, the huia, to argue that there are compelling reasons to resurrect certain species if it 
can be done. I then argue that synthetically created organisms needn’t be perfectly 
indistinguishable from their genetic forebears in order for species de-extinction to be successful. 
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1. Introduction 
 The general idea behind de-extinction needs little introduction thanks to 
the Jurassic Park movies. Genes recovered from remnants of dead organisms 
are pasted into the genomes of living organisms. The aim is to resurrect extinct 
genes and traits, or—as in Jurassic Park—resurrect extinct species in their 
entirety. 
De-extinction has arguably already passed from science fiction to science 
fact, with the first semi-successful (very brief) species de-extinction—involving 
the Pyrenean ibex—taking place in 2009. The paleogenticist, Beth Shapiro, 
describes the current technological state of play in her book, How to Clone a 
Mammoth: The Science of De-extinction (Princeton University Press, 2015). 
The book outlines numerous issues to be addressed and impediments to be 
circumvented at each step of the de-extinction process.  
From a philosophical perspective perhaps the book’s most interesting 
element is Shapiro’s stance regarding how de-extinction technology can and 
should be applied for the purposes of wildlife conservation. Shapiro mentions the 
following four potential applications (although without clearly distinguishing 
A1 and A2 from A3): 
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A1.  Combatting inbreeding depression in a genetically depauperate 
species by inserting extinct genes from remnants of dead members of 
the same species. 
A2.  Genetically fortifying a species against some threat (e.g., disease, 
habitat loss, pollution, or climate change) by inserting genes from a 
different (potentially extinct) donor species. This is known as 
‘facilitated adaptation’ (Thomas et al. 2013).   
A3.  Creating a proxy for an extinct keystone species by inserting some of 
its genes into a living relative of that species, with the aim of 
restoring or resurrecting an entire ecosystem.  
A4.  Resurrecting an extinct species.  
 
A1—A4 are ordered in terms of how radical the proposed intervention is. 
A1 involves only the intraspecies gene-transfer. A2 instead involves the 
interspecies gene-transfer and the creation of a genetic hybrid, with the aim of 
protecting the recipient species from a threat. A3 is similar to A2 in involving 
interspecies gene-transfer, but its primary goal is the deliberate introduction of 
a genetically modified organism into an ecosystem in order to re-engineer the 
ecosystem itself. Whereas A1—A3 each involve only de-extinction of genes, A4 
involves the wholesale de-extinction of species—i.e., of entire genomes. The 
following versions of A4 can be distinguished: 
 
A4a: Resurrecting a species humans didn’t drive to extinction. 
A4b: Resurrecting a species humans did drive to extinction. 
 
A4i: Resurrecting a species that underwent unmanaged extinction. 
A4ii: Resurrecting a species that underwent managed extinction.  
 
Here a ‘managed extinction’ is an extinction that takes place after 
deliberate preparatory groundwork has been laid for subsequent de-extinction 
(including, say, the cryopreservation of genetically diverse live tissue samples).  
Because humans are implicated in virtually all extinctions recent enough 
for usable DNA to still exist, prospective species de-extinctions will, with rare 
exceptions, be of types A4bi or A4bii, not A4ai or A4aii.  
The following desiderata would need to be satisfied by any successful de-
extinction project: 
 
1. At some time, t1, there was an ancestral population of organisms, 
Pa. 
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2. At some later time, t2, there was no population of organisms 
standing in the ‘same species’ relationship to Pa. 
3. At a yet later time, t3, a new population of organisms, Pb, is created 
synthetically, such that Pa and Pb stand in a ‘same species’ relation 
to each other.  
 
What is the ‘same species’ relation? What conditions is it necessary and 
sufficient for Pa and Pb to satisfy in order for them to be two populations of one 
species? This is a vexed question because the term ‘species’ is notoriously 
ambiguous. It is used to express at least twenty six distinct concepts within sub-
fields of biology (Wilkins 2009; Hausdorf 2011), and it is prima facie possible 
that it is being used to express yet another (twenty-seventh) concept in the 
context of species de-extinction. Hence we can’t resolve what the ‘same species’ 
relation consists in by just consulting a dictionary. But whatever it might consist 
in, it is clear for some salient sense of the expression ‘the same species’, Pa and 
Pb must indeed be of the same species in order for a species de-extinction project 
to be successful. Otherwise we would not, in creating Pb, have resurrected Pa’s 
species.  
Shapiro says little about A1 and A2, but endorses them both (pp. 9 & 
205-206). Her focus is A3. She holds A3 to be the most valuable potential 
conservation application of de-extinction technology. Her primary example is a 
plan, already underway, to paste a small number of mammoth genes into the 
genome of the Asian elephant, in order to create a cold-tolerant elephant 
(perhaps with a woolly coat and haemoglobin that conveys oxygen efficiently at 
low blood temperature) adapted for life in the mammoth’s former stamping 
ground. This plan combines aspects of A2 and A3. Where A2 is concerned, one 
major beneficiary would be the elephant itself, since the re-engineered elephants 
would be able to range into regions sparsely inhabited by people. Where A3 is 
concerned, the re-engineered elephants could perform important ecological roles 
in the arctic tundra formerly performed by creatures like mammoths and woolly 
rhinoceroses. In Shapiro’s words, elephants would ‘no longer be isolated to 
declining habitat in the Old World. Instead, they would be free to wander in the 
open spaces of Siberia, Alaska, and Northern Europe, restoring to these places 
all of the benefits of a large dynamic herbivore that have been missing for eight 
thousand years’ (p. 207). 
Whereas Shapiro is supportive of A1 and A2 and an earnest advocate of 
A3, she strenuously opposes A4 (including, I take it, A4bii). She doesn’t think 
de-extinction technology can or should be used to resurrect extinct species. Her 
opposition to A4 is based on the following rationales: 
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S1.  Pa and Pb will not stand in this ‘same-species’ relation to each other 
unless the following condition is met: 
 
100% condition: The organisms in Pa and Pb are 100% genetically, 
physiologically and behaviorally indistinguishable from each other. 
 
S2.  It will almost certainly never be technically possible to satisfy the 
100% condition. 
S3.  Even if it were technically possible to resurrect an extinct species, 
which it isn’t because of S1 and S2, there would be no compelling 
conservation-based reason to do so.  
 
S1—S3 are framed in my words, not Shapiro’s, but I believe they 
accurately summarize sentiments Shapiro expresses in passages like these: 
 
Extinct species are gone forever. We will never bring something back that is 100 percent 
identical—physiologically, genetically, and behaviorally identical—to a species that is no 
longer alive. (p. 10) 
 
The product of de-extinction won’t be the same thing as the original species… Crucially 
however, I don’t care that it’s not the same thing as the original... The task ahead is not 
to make perfect replicas of species that were once alive. First, it is technically not 
possible to do so and is unlikley ever to be technically possible to do so. Second, there is 
no compelling reason to make perfect replicas of extinct species. (p. 205, her italics) 
 
In my mind, it is ecological resurrection, and not species resurrection, that is the real 
value of de-extinction. We should think of de-extinction not in terms of which life form 
we will bring back, but what ecological interactions we would like to see restored. (p. 
131, her italics) 
 
I am sympathetic to Shapiro’s claim that A3 is an especially valuable 
prospective application of de-extinction technology. A3 differs from A1, A2, 
and A4 by promising an especially big conservation ‘bang’ for each de-
extinction buck. It potentially involves transferring only a few well-chosen 
genes, yet could help restore entire lost ecosystems, benefitting innumerable 
species. But, while I agree with Shapiro that A3 may be de-extinction’s ‘killer 
app’ in the short to medium term, I think: (i) that she is wrong to dismiss A4 as 
lacking conservation value; and (ii) that S1—S3 provide a flawed rationale for 
dismissing it. My own view is that A4, and especially A4bii, is liable to be of 
immense conservation value in the long (and very long) term, by enabling the 
recovery of some small but precious fraction of the innumerable species that will 
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be lost to anthropogenic causes like climate change over coming decades and 
centuries.  
The remainder of this paper is dedicated to critiquing Shapiro’s position. 
Since Shapiro is the paleogeneticist while I am the philosopher, and since S2 is 
an empirical claim concerning limitations of de-extinction technology, I bow to 
her judgment where S2 is concerned. I focus instead on refuting S1 and S3. In 
doing this I use the prospective de-extinction of an extinct New Zealand 
wattlebird species, the huia (Heteralocha acutirostris), as an example. §2 
describes why the huia is a good technical candidate for de-extinction, and 
why—contrary to S3—there are compelling conservation-based reasons to 
resurrect it. §3 argues—contrary to S1—that such a resurrection could count 
as being successful even if the 100% condition were not met. §4 briefly 
considers the nature of the ‘same species’ relation. §5 wraps things up.   
Before I start, some caveats. In arguing for the conservation value of 
species de-extinction (i.e., A4) I am not suggesting that existing, inadequate 
conservation resources be diverted to species de-extinction. Where species de-
extinction is concerned conservationists have a rare luxury—all the time in the 
world. The strategy, in almost all cases, should be to freeze sources of extinct 
genes to stop DNA degradation (which is inexorable at room temperature), and 
then revive the species only if and when de-extinction becomes sufficiently 
inexpensive or resources become available (Ryder et al. 2000; Crist 2008).  
Nor am I suggesting that de-extinction offers a sensible alternative to 
preventing extinctions occurring in the first place, or a technological ‘quick fix’ 
to the looming Holocene mass-extinction event. Only species with unusual 
combinations of attributes are plausible candidates for de-extinction in the first 
place (Seddon, Moehrenschlager, and Ewen 2014), and in the rare cases when 
de-extinction is technically feasible ‘starting from zero’ will almost always be 
immensely more problematic and difficult than starting from an intact breeding 
population, however small it might be.  
Finally, if I am right then—contra Shapiro—there are compelling reasons 
to make some species, like the huia, de-extinct, but it remains possible that 
these reasons, compelling though they are, are offset by even more compelling 
reasons not to (e.g., reasons involving moral hazard or unexpected 
environmental impacts). Any decision whether to resurrect species must be 
based on a thorough-going cost-benefit analysis far beyond the scope of this 
article. 
 
2. The huia as a candidate for de-extinction 
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It is difficult to argue convincingly for species de-extinction in wholly 
abstract, hypothetical terms. The details matter, and details emerge only in the 
context of real-life examples. The example I will work with is that of the huia, a 
New Zealand bird driven to extinction about a hundred years ago (the date is 
uncertain) by Victorian and Edwardian collectors, habitat loss, and introduced 
mammalian predators. The huia appears a remarkably good candidate for de-
extinction both because of its very great aesthetic and cultural value (of which 
more shortly) and for the following technical reasons: 
 
1. Genetic material. Huia were shot in their thousands by collectors for their 
skins and feathers, which are now held in large numbers by museums 
around the world. For this reason the chances of the huia’s genome and 
genetic diversity being recoverable appear relatively good.1 
2. Habitat. New Zealand has numerous predator-free ‘mainland islands’ and 
offshore islands where de-extinct huia could be released and would likely 
flourish  (as demonstrated by many successful translocations of endangered 
birds into the same places). 
3. Animal husbandry. Huia were extremely confiding birds and easily kept in 
captivity, as would be necessary in the early stages of a de-extinction 
project (Buller 1888, 9–14). Moreover, conservationists have considerable 
experience in the captive rearing of closely related species (kokako, and 
saddleback).  
4. Ease of containment. Huia were (like kokako) incapable of sustained flight. 
Hence populations of transgenic huia could easily be kept geographically 
contained as required. 
5. Founder group size. Huia pair-bonded for life. This increases effective 
population size, reduces genetic drift and means only a relatively small 
founder group is required to create a genetically healthy population (Miller 
et al. 2009).   
6. Genome size. Birds have significantly smaller genomes than mammals and 
reptiles, easing genome-reconstruction. 
7. Technique. Birds are amenable to de-extinction via primordial germ cell 
transplantation (PGCT), a technique much more efficient than cloning 
(Shapiro 2015, 81 & 153–158). As applied to huia, it might proceed 
roughly as follows. Huia genes would be inserted in place of kokako genes 
in living kokako cells. These cells would be transformed into primordial 





chimeric chickens thus produced would be allowed to mature and breed with 
other such chickens. ‘Huia’ would hatch from the resulting eggs.  
 
Why resurrect huia? It might be suggested it should be done to salve our 
guilty consciences, or to pay a debt of restorative justice we owe the huia 
because we exterminated them (Crist 2008; Sherkow and Greely 2013; Cohen 
2014). Arguably these are not good reasons. As noted by Sandler (2013), we 
can’t owe a debt of restorative justice to a species since species are not 
intentional agents. Nor can we owe such a debt to individual huia, since 
presently none exist. Moreover, as many have pointed out, it is not obvious that 
there is generally anything morally wrong in one species causing the extinction 
of another (such extinctions being regular and inevitable events in natural 
history), or any reason why we should feel guilty for our ancestors’ extirpation 
of other species (a child not being guilty of her parent’s crimes). Nor, as 
Shapiro notes (2015, 26), is it obvious that our guilty feelings, if justified, 
would provide good reason to bring species back from the dead.    
But if some reasons for resurrecting the huia are bad, it nowise follows 
that all are. An obvious reason to stop a species going extinct in the first place 
is because we don’t want to lose something that is valuable to us. This suggests, 
by extension, that a reason to resurrect an extinct species might be to recover 
something of value to us that has been lost already. On this way of thinking 
about de-extinction, the aim is not so much to undo a crime we committed 
against an extinct species, as to undo a crime previous generations of people 
committed against us and future generations by exterminating a species we 
would greatly value if it still existed. This is, I think, a compelling reason to 
resurrect huia. 
In what respects were huia of value? Huia were the most sexually 
dimorphic of any bird species on Earth, with males and females having beaks of 
radically different lengths and shapes specialized for different modes of feeding. 
On a plausible theory of how biodiversity is to be measured (Maclaurin and 
Sterelny 2008), huia made an outsized contribution to the Earth’s biodiversity 
because of this phenotypic uniqueness.  
Huia were also of enormous value as a cultural treasure to the Māori.  
The Māori considered them the most sacred (tapu) of all New Zealand’s fauna, 
with, for example, the wearing of huia feathers and skins being reserved for 
chiefs of the highest status. (This played an unfortunate part in their demise. A 
European fashion for wearing huia feathers in hats began when, as a token of 
respect, a Māori guide placed a huia tail-feather in the hatband of the visiting 
Duke of York, soon to be King George V. The species was then quickly 
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decimated.) The huia were central to the identity of the Ngati huia, who were 
custodians of much of the forest to which huia were confined. The huia’s 
extinction was a shocking cultural loss for the Ngati huia. When the huia’s de-
extinction was first mooted in the 1990’s the plan gained the tribe’s backing. 
Yet another reason why huia were of value—and it is this reason I will 
focus on—is because of their capacity to help stimulate and foster human 
aesthetic enjoyment and appreciation of New Zealand’s wilderness. Huia were, 
by all accounts, extraordinarily beautiful and charismatic creatures. The deep 
impression they made on early European settlers is apparent in the many roads, 
schools, and geographical features named after them, in the fervor with which 
collectors hunted them, and in passages like these from the writings of avid 
collector, Sir Walter Buller (a major historical source of information about 
huia): 
 
a pair of Huia, without uttering a sound, appeared in a tree overhead, and as they were 
caressing each other with their beautiful bills, a charge of No. 6 brought them both to the 
ground together. The incident was rather touching and I felt almost glad that the shot 
was not mine… (Buller 1888, 13) 
 
In a few seconds, without sound or warning of any kind, a Huia came bounding along, 
almost tumbling, through the close foliage of the pukapuka, and presented himself to view 
at such close range that it was impossible to fire. This gave me an opportunity of 
watching this beautiful bird and marking his noble bearing, if I may so express it, before I 
shot him. (ibid.) 
 
Due in part to the absence of indigenous land mammals in New Zealand, 
native birds—and especially beautiful, charismatic and confiding birds—are the 
‘stars’ of the New Zealand bush. Their existence is a great part of the reason 
why humans enjoy and appreciate the bush, and thus cherish and protect it. 
Were any of the most charismatic of the bird species—e.g., the fantail, tui, or 
kereru—to go extinct, it would be universally deemed a tragic loss, and not just 
for the species in question but also for present and future generations of New 
Zealanders. The loss of the huia was plausibly a tragedy of even greater 
magnitude, for huia were arguably the most beautiful and charismatic of all the 
New Zealand birds—the greatest of the ‘stars’. Wonderful though it still is, the 
New Zealand bush is, thanks in part to the loss of the huia (along with many 
other remarkable species), very much less wonderful than it used to be. The 
extermination of the huia is in this respect comparable to the destruction of a 
beautiful natural or historical landmark or monument (Norton 1986, 108–109). 
It was (to modern eyes) an act of barbaric environmental vandalism that has 
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harmed us and future generations by ‘detracting from the quality of human 
experience as a whole’ (ibid., 109). In doing this it has also indirectly harmed 
other, less charismatic species by reducing our incentive to value and protect 
their habitat. 
Imagine the following hypothetical scenario. Conservationists carefully 
survey a remote New Zealand valley and—miraculously!—discover a tiny, 
remnant population of huia still clinging to survival. An urgent and successful 
recovery program is launched, with the result that decades later huia are again 
widespread. People can once more know the delight of encountering these birds, 
providing a further, powerful reason to love, protect and regrow the bush. A 
major conservationist victory is thereby won. 
Probably the victory cannot be won this way, it being most unlikely that 
any remnant population of huia still exists.2 But—and this is the crucial point—
de-extinction promises an alternative way of securing the same, very valuable 
outcome. This being so, and contrary to what Shapiro says, there is surely a 
compelling conservation-based reason to resurrect species like the huia provided 
it can be done. 
  
3. Can huia be resurrected without satisfying the 100% condition? 
In contending that species de-extinction is technically impossible, Shapiro 
assumes that a species can have been successfully resurrected only if the newly 
created organisms satisfy the 100% condition with respect to the ancestral 
population. Shapiro doesn’t justify this assumption. It might be defended using 
the following argument (loosely suggested by some of her words – see p. 205): 
 
If the product of de-extinction isn’t a population of organisms that satisfies 
the 100% condition with respect to the original species, then it is not the 
same thing as the original species, and if it is not the same thing as the 
original species, then the original species has not been successfully 
resurrected.  
 
But this argument is obviously invalid. It confuses qualitative non-identity 
with numerical non-identity. It is true that if the newly created population, Pb, 
doesn’t satisfy the 100% condition with respect to the ancestral population, Pa, 
then Pa and Pb are qualitatively non-identical populations (i.e., they have 






numerically distinct species. After all, adaptation and genetic drift constantly 
cause small changes in the physiology, behavior and genetics of species, and we 
don’t declare one species to have passed away and a new species to have been 
created every time there is some such tiny change. Given that the ‘same species’ 
relation is in this way tolerant of minor changes through time in the properties 
of species, it is difficult to understand why a species de-extinction attempt must 
avoid introducing any such changes if it is to be successful. 
Not only does Shapiro’s 100% assumption seem implausible on its face, 
but her own book contains powerful reasons for thinking it false. Shapiro 
describes techniques that can be used to produce organisms belonging to one 
species, A, using living cells from species A and the surrogacy services of 
another (usually closely related) species, B (pp. 137-138 & 153-158). These 
techniques include interspecies somatic cell nuclear transfer (cloning) and 
interspecies PGCT (mentioned above). Shapiro explains how these techniques 
can be (and indeed, already have been) used to boost the populations of 
endangered breeds and species by using the surrogacy services of other breeds 
and species. For example, she explains how PGCT can be used to produce ‘a 
pure-bred rare-breed chicken that hatches from the egg laid by a common 
chicken’, so as to ‘boost the population size of rare or endangered chicken 
breeds’ (p. 156) 
As explained in §1, Shapiro also endorses A2—the idea that we can save 
endangered species from extinction by facilitated adaptation. In using this 
technique we would start with an initial population, Pa—say the current 
population of Asian elephants—which we would then transform into a new, 
genotypically and phenotypically different population, Pb—say, a population of 
cold-adapted ‘woolly’ Asian elephants. Pb would obviously not satisfy the 100% 
condition with respect to Pa, the whole point of facilitated adaptation being to 
increase the fitness of a species by deliberately altering aspects of its physiology 
and/or behavior. Thus by endorsing facilitated adaptation as a means of saving 
species from extinction Shapiro is tacitly committed to holding that the 100% 
condition need not be satisfied at least in the context of facilitated adaptation. 
Otherwise by reengineering Asian elephants for cold tolerance we would be 
destroying the elephant species, by turning elephants into non-elephants, not 
saving the elephant species (Siipi 2014, 85). 
Now consider the following sequence of hypothetical scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1 (population boosting, with intermixing) 
i. A tiny remnant population of living huia, Pa, is found surviving in a 
remote valley. Their cells are sampled and cryogenically preserved. 
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ii. The cells sampled in step i are used to create a new population of 
‘huia’, Pb, via interspecies PGCT and the surrogacy services of (say) 
chickens. Pb satisfies the 100% condition with respect to Pa. 
iii. The two populations, Pa and Pb, are now allowed to mix and 
interbreed. 
 
Scenario 2 (population boosting, without intermixing) 
As for scenario 1, except that the original population, Pa, dies out after Pb 
has been created but before Pa and Pb have the opportunity to intermix and 
interbreed. (So the new ‘huia’ never get to meet their forebears.) 
 
Scenario 3 (a de-extinction that satisfies the 100% condition) 
As for Scenario 2, except that the original population, Pa, dies out after their 
cells have been sampled and preserved but before Pb  has been created—
meaning that there is a brief interlude when the huia population falls to zero 
(i.e., huia are briefly extinct). 
 
Scenario 4 (a de-extinction that satisfies the 100% condition, followed by 
facilitated adaptation) 
As for scenario 3, except that after Pb has been created it is subjected to 
facilitated adaptation, transforming it into a new population, Pc, that is 
genetically protected from some threat (say, a disease). Pc thus differs from 
Pb in that it no longer satisfies the 100% condition with respect to Pa. 
 
Scenario 5 (a de-extinction that doesn’t satisfy the 100% condition)  
As for Scenario 4, except that the two steps, of creating Pb, and then 
modifying Pb to create Pc, are collapsed into a single step, in which Pc is 
created directly, without creating Pb first.  
 
Scenario 1 is a straightforward case of PCGT being used to boost the 
numbers of a critically endangered species (albeit with the added feature that 
the synthetically created organisms are 100% indistinguishable from the 
original population). Since Shapiro endorses this method of boosting an 
endangered species’ population as being a valuable technique in the 
conservationist’s arsenal, she will, I take it, accept that the newly created Pb 
birds of scenario 1 really are huia (which can therefore interbreed with the 
original Pa birds without undermining or diluting the integrity of the species). 
Scenarios 2 and 3 differ from scenario 1 only with respect to the fate of 
the original huia population, Pa. It is very difficult to understand why extrinsic 
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facts about the times of death of the Pa huia should make any difference to 
whether or not Pb ‘huia’ are huia. (Surely the facts about whether a Pb bird is 
an authentic huia won’t depend on whether, at the time when this Pb bird was 
created, some Pa bird still happened to be alive somewhere in the bush.) For 
this reason it seems Shapiro must, having granted that the Pb birds of scenario 
1 are authentic huia, make the same concession regarding the Pb birds of 
scenarios 2 and 3.  
The Pc birds of scenario 4 are in effect obtained by subjecting the Pb birds 
of scenario 3 to facilitated adaptation. As explained above, Shapiro is tacitly 
committed to accepting that facilitated adaptation leaves the authenticity of a 
species intact (for otherwise it wouldn’t offer a way of saving a species from a 
threat). Thus, having conceded that the Pb birds of scenario 3 are authentic 
huia, it appears Shapiro must say the same of the Pc birds of scenario 4. 
Finally, the Pc birds of scenario 5 differ from those of scenario 4 only in 
having been produced by a more efficient, one-step process (wherein Pc birds 
are created directly, instead of by first creating Pb birds that are 100% the 
same as Pa birds and then modifying these Pb birds to create Pc birds). It is very 
difficult to understand why collapsing two steps into one would detract from the 
authenticity of the resulting organisms. Thus, having conceded that the Pc birds 
of scenario 4 are authentic huia, it seems Shapiro has no option but to grant 
that the Pc birds of scenario 5 are authentic too. 
Now, to the point. The reasons just adduced for holding that the Pc birds 
of scenario 5 are authentic huia are, I believe, compelling. In so far as Shapiro 
is committed by what she says to granting the authenticity of these birds, there 
is, I think, nothing wrong with her position; she is on solid ground. But these 
reasons for accepting the authenticity of the birds created in scenario 5 double 
as reasons for thinking Shapiro’s 100% assumption is false. Scenario 5 is, after 
all, a scenario in which we make huia de-extinct by creating a new population of 
birds that do not satisfy the 100% condition with respect to the ancestral 
population.  
Shapiro can’t have it both ways. Given she accepts (i) that interspecies 
PGCT (and/or cloning) can be used to boost populations of endangered species, 
and (ii) that facilitated adaptation can be used to protect species from a threat, 
then she can’t also maintain (iii) that a species de-extinction project must 
satisfy the 100% condition in order to be successful. (i) and (ii) subtly 
contradict (iii). 
 
4. What is the ‘same species’ relation? 
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How are we to judge whether a resurrected ‘huia’ is an authentic huia? 
The 100% condition is a purported answer to this question. There are strong 
reasons, just explained, to reject this answer as unsatisfactory. But our reasons 
for rejecting it would be much stronger still if we had a better answer to offer in 
its place. What might a better answer look like? 
Consider the following hypotheses: 
 
H1.  At least for de-extinction purposes, Pb counts as being the same species as 
Pa iff the members of Pb and Pa are sufficiently similar in outward 
appearance and behavior.  
H2.  At least for de-extinction purposes, Pb counts as being the same species as 
Pa just to the degree that many of the evolutionarily adaptive traits 
possessed by the members of Pa have been genetically inherited by and are 
being phenotypically expressed by members of Pb.  
 
H1 is implausible, but it will be illuminating to examine why it is 
implausible before we turn to H2. H1 implies that de-extinct ‘huia’ must merely 
outwardly resemble ancestral huia to be authentic. For example, imagine that 
the genome of a common raven (or another bird only distantly related to the 
huia) was modified to create birds with body-shape, plumage, diet, song, sexual-
dimorphism and behavior approximating the huia’s. Moreover, imagine this was 
done by brute-force genetic engineering, not by replacing raven genes with huia 
genes. Thus with regards their underlying genetics and physiology the new 
birds are—to the extent they resemble any naturally occurring species—raven-
like, not huia-like. Provided these new ‘huia lookalikes’ are sufficiently 
outwardly similar to ancestral huia, H1 implies that we would, in creating 
them, have re-created authentic huia.  
Intuitively this seems wrong, but why? Light is shed on the answer to this 
question by considering the purpose of species de-extinction. Let the aesthetic 
quality of a thing (e.g., of a species) be its capacity to evoke human feelings of 
wonder, awe, pleasure and appreciation. In §2 I argued, in effect, that one 
powerful reason to resurrect the huia is to recover the aesthetic quality lost 
when the huia went extinct. Now, would we successfully recover this lost 
aesthetic quality by creating modified ravens that outwardly resemble huia? I 
think it is clear we would not. It is surely the case that, at least for a well-
informed person, a significant part of what would be so wonderful about seeing 
huia in the New Zealand bush again would be recognizing them to be the 
product of natural section operating on ancestral huia in the same bush over 
unfathomable eons of time. A bird that lacked this intimate historical connection 
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with ancestral huia and with primeval New Zealand would lack much of the 
aesthetic quality of ancestral huia, no matter how much it might look like a huia 
on the surface. Most of the details of the design of the modified ravens will have 
been settled by evolution operating, not on ancestral huia populations, but on 
ancestral raven populations. Although such birds should perhaps still stimulate 
our awe, it would be awe at the skill of the scientists who created them, not awe 
at seeing marvelous and beautiful biochemical machines whose innumerable 
working parts have been sculpted by millions of years of adaptation for survival 
in the New Zealand bush. Why then are the modified ravens not authentic huia? 
Because we would not, in creating them, have successfully attained a primary 
goal of a project to resurrect the huia—viz., to recover the aesthetic quality lost 
when huia went extinct. 
H2 is much more promising. It improves on H1 by implying that a 
creature’s authenticity depends on its inheritance of evolved traits from the 
ancestral population. It also makes authenticity a matter of degree and 
dependent on how many adaptively significant traits are copied from Pa to Pb. 
For example H2 implies that recreated ‘huia’ would be mostly, but not fully, 
authentic if the only genetic discrepancy between the recreated and ancestral 
birds was in a gene (say, a gene for eye color) that made little or no difference 
to the expression of the vast majority of adaptive traits. This is supported by 
the idea that we would judge the aesthetic quality of the huia to be mostly, but 
not fully, restored in such a case. H2 also implies that it is unnecessary to 
accurately copy adaptively unimportant DNA sequences from ancestral huia, 
that play no protein-coding or regulatory role (and that have therefore been 
shaped by random genetic drift rather than by natural selection). It implies that 
only genes, and aspects thereof, that have been shaped by natural selection 
matter. This is supported by the thought that it would be a pointless waste to 
devote resources to accurately copying parts of the ancestral huia genome that 
have no phenotypic effect.  
Limitations of space mean I must refine and defend H2 elsewhere. My 
purpose in briefly outlining it here is only to show that the task of finding 
alternatives to the 100% condition is by no means hopeless or impossible. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In denying that resurrecting species would, even if practicable, be 
worthwhile, Shapiro fails to consider that its worth might lie in recovering 
things of value lost when species went extinct, like aesthetic quality, cultural 
importance, or biodiversity. In denying that species de-extinction is technically 
possible in the first place she assumes de-extinct organisms would need to 
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satisfy the 100% condition in order to be authentic. I hope to have persuaded 
the reader that this assumption is neither plausible, nor compatible with other 
views she expresses, nor forced on us by a dearth of alternative hypotheses. 
Fortunately these weaknesses in Shapiro’s philosophical position matter 
little where the main value of her book is concerned. It is a font of fascinating 
information about the current science and technology of de-extinction. 
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